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Genetically Modified Food Fight: The FDA 
Should Step Up to the Regulatory Plate so States 
Do Not Cross the Constitutional Line 
Morgan Anderson Helme∗ 
We know how many calories are in it. We know if it con-
tains gluten, and its percentage of sodium out of an ideal daily 
diet.1 Fat-free, sugar-free, may contain peanuts, all natural, 
and an excellent source of fiber—the label spells it all out for 
concerned consumers.2 But despite this apparent glutton of in-
formation about the food we eat,3 the use of genetically modi-
fied ingredients remains a guessing game in the grocery aisle.4 
Farms are rapidly expanding use of genetically engineered 
crops, which, in turn, increases their presence in food.5 In 1997, 
17% of U.S. soybean acreage was genetically modified.6
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 1. See Daniel A. Kracov & Joshua M. Glasser, The Regulation of Foods 
and Food Additives, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW 
REGULATION 257, 284 (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 4th ed. 2012). 
 2. See id. at 257, 282, 318. 
 3. See id. at 278.  
 4. See Kammi L. Rencher, Food Choice and Fundamental Rights: A Piece 
of Cake or Pie in the Sky?, 12 NEV. L.J. 418, 429 (2012). 
 5. See Sheldon Krimsky, The Birth of Synthetic Biology and the Genetic 
Mode of Production, in GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: INTERIM POLICIES, 
UNCERTAIN LEGISLATION 3, 10–11 (Iain E.P. Taylor ed., 2007) (describing the 
trajectory of plant modification from classical breeding to modern genetic en-
gineering). 
 6. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically 
-engineered-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx (last updated 
July 9, 2013).  
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that percentage has rocketed to 93%.7 Other crops that are 
widely used in processed foods—from cooking oil to corn-
flakes—have followed similar trajectories.8 The Grocery Manu-
facturers Association estimates between 75% and 80% of con-
ventional processed foods contain genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs).9
As GMOs pervade the marketplace without long-term, un-
biased research on their health impacts,
 
10 more consumers are 
demanding that they have a right to know if GMOs are present 
in their food.11 Whole Foods recently announced it was respond-
ing to consumer demand by implementing mandatory labeling 
of genetically modified food, making it the first major retailer to 
require GMO labels.12 Ben & Jerry’s has announced that it will 
stop use of GMO ingredients in its ice cream by 2015,13 and 
Chipotle has begun disclosing use of GMOs on its website in an 
effort to be transparent with consumers.14
 
 7. Id. 
 On a larger scale, at 
least sixty countries have implemented GMO labeling laws or 
 8. See id. (charting acreage of genetically engineered crops in the United 
States). 
 9. Press Release, Whole Foods Market, Studies Show GMOs in Majority 
of U.S. Processed Foods, 58 Percent of Americans Unaware of Issue (Oct. 7, 
2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/studies-show 
-gmos-in-majority-of-us-processed-foods-58-percent-of-americans-unaware-of-
issue-104510549.html. 
 10. Cf. Chineme OK Anyadiegwu, Health Risks of Genetically Modified 
Food: A Need for Unbiased Research into the Potential Health Risks of Genet-
ically Engineered Crop Products, 13 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 203, 210–12 
(2003) (arguing that a lack of critical assessment fuels consumer concern). 
 11. See Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc. to Just Label It! 
(Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://justlabelit.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/ 
Mellman-Survey-Results.pdf (finding that 91% of Americans support manda-
tory labeling of GMOs). 
 12. Stephanie Strom, Major Grocer to Label Foods with Gene-Modified 
Content, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/ 
business/grocery-chain-to-require-labels-for-genetically-modified-food.html? 
pagewanted=all&r=0. The labels, which will be implemented by 2018, have 
not yet been created. Id.  
 13. Hunter Stewart, Ben & Jerry’s Will Stop Using Genetically-Modified 
Ingredients, Company Says, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2013), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/02/ben-and-jerrys-gmos-genetically-modified_n_ 
3372451.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000003.  
 14. Justin Bachman, The Genetically Modified Burrito: Chipotle Tells All, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 18, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
articles/2013-06-18/the-genetically-modified-burrito-chipotle-tells-all. Chipotle 
also intends to reduce use of GMOs, but does not believe it can completely 
eliminate them from its menus because of the nature of the U.S. food system. 
Id.  
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regulations.15 The United States federal government16 and 
twenty-five states17 have also considered labeling requirements, 
but none has implemented GMO label mandates to date.18
California’s November 2012 GMO labeling ballot measure
  
19 
brought national attention to the debate, although it failed to 
pass by a narrow margin.20 Despite this letdown at the polls, 
other states are continuing to pursue GMO labeling legisla-
tion.21
 
 15. Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act, S. 809, 113th Cong. 
§ 2 (2013). 
 While states may be eager to step in to protect consum-
 16. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 
Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,991 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Statement of Policy] 
(refusing to mandate labeling). Rep. Dennis Kucinich proposed amendments to 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in seven consecutive House sessions 
to require food containing genetically engineered ingredients to be labeled ac-
cordingly, with no success. Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, 
H.R. 3553, 112th Cong. (2011); Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know 
Act, H.R. 5577, 111th Cong. (2010); Genetically Engineered Food Right to 
Know Act, H.R. 6636, 110th Cong. (2008); Genetically Engineered Food Right 
to Know Act, H.R. 5269, 109th Cong. (2006); Genetically Engineered Food 
Right to Know Act, H.R. 2916, 108th Cong. (2003); Genetically Engineered 
Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 4814, 107th Cong. (2002); Genetically Engi-
neered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 3377, 106th Cong. (1999). Most recently, 
Sen. Barbara Boxer introduced the Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-
Know Act in the Senate that would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act to require the FDA to promulgate mandatory labeling regulations 
for GMOs. S. 809, 113th Cong. (2013). A companion bill was introduced in the 
House by Rep. Peter DeFazio on the same day. Genetically Engineered Food 
Right-to-Know Act, H.R. 1699, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill was referred to 
committees in both the House and the Senate on April 24, 2013. Cong. Re-
search Serv., All Actions H.R.1699—113th Congress (2013–2014), CON-
GRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/house-bill/1699/all 
-actions/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013); Cong. Research Serv., All Actions S.809—
113th Congress (2013–2014), CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/ 
113th-congress/senate-bill/809/all-actions/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).  
 17. See Take Action in Your State, RIGHT TO KNOW GMO, http://www 
.righttoknow-gmo.org/states (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (showing states’ GMO 
labeling efforts).  
 18. Id. 
 19. The California Right to Know Genetically Engineered Food Act, 2012 
Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 37 (rejected by voters on Nov. 6, 2012), available 
at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Proposition 37]. 
 20. DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 13 (2013), 
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012-general/sov-complete.pdf 
(reporting that 51.4% voted against labeling and 48.6% voted in favor). 
 21. See Take Action in Your State, supra note 17; see also Mike Hughlett, 
Bills Would Require Labels on Genetically Engineered Food in Minnesota, 
STAR TRIB., Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.startribune.com/business/194056041 
.html (describing genetically engineered labeling bills introduced in the Min-
nesota Legislature); Elaine Watson, New Mexico GMO Labeling Bill Heads for 
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ers, such regulations may not pass constitutional muster. New 
food labeling requirements could have considerable impact on 
interstate commerce, raising potential Commerce Clause objec-
tions.22 Further, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act23 al-
ready provides for extensive regulation of food labeling, per-
haps implicating federal preemption.24
This Note does not engage in the debate over the safety of 
GMOs. Rather, it contends that if consumers desire labeling 
mandates, such regulations must originate within the federal 
government. Part I provides an overview of mandatory GMO 
labeling, including proposed state regulations and the Food and 
Drug Administration’s current stated position. Part II argues 
that states do not have constitutional authority to enact GMO 
labeling requirements. Finally, Part III addresses potential so-
lutions and recommends voluntary labeling regulations with 
binding standards to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
This Note concludes that state regulations requiring mandato-
ry GMO labeling are unconstitutional, and urges the FDA to 
respond to the growing concern by enacting realistic, uniform 
regulations for labeling food produced from genetically engi-
neered (GE) ingredients. 
 If states take a stand on 
this issue, such regulations may not last for long.  
I.  GMO REGULATIONS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK   
This Part introduces current and proposed regulations of 
GMO labeling, and the constitutional framework for evaluating 
such regulations. Section A provides an overview of the FDA’s 
current position on GMOs compared to the agency’s historical 
role. Section B summarizes various state proposals for labeling 
genetically modified food. Finally, Section C introduces the con-
 
State Legislature, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www 
.foodnavigator-usa.com/Regulation/New-Mexico-GMO-labeling-bill-heads-for 
-state-legislature (discussing mandatory labeling initiatives in New Mexico, 
Washington, Oregon, Florida, and Connecticut in 2013).  
 22. Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The 
Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 312–14 
(2006) (“State statutes that require labels on out-of-state products run the risk 
of burdening interstate commerce and creating a lack of political accountabil-
ity.”). 
 23. 21 U.S.C. §§ 341–343 (2006). 
 24. See generally Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Federal Pre-Emption of 
State Food Labeling Legislation or Regulation, 79 A.L.R. FED. 181 (1986) (dis-
cussing cases pertaining to federal law preempting food labeling laws). 
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stitutional considerations that state regulations will face if 
passed.  
A. FDA’S REGULATION OF GMOS (OR LACK THEREOF?) 
The FDA is not a newcomer to the federal regulatory 
world, though its role has adapted over the years.25 In its very 
early years, starting from its establishment in 1848, the agency 
(then the Agricultural Division of the Patent Office) served an 
advisory role to other federal agencies on scientific and tech-
nical matters.26 The modern era of the FDA began in 1906 with 
the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act,27 which provided 
the FDA with additional authority to enforce food and drug 
standards in interstate commerce.28 The FDA at this time was 
only an enforcement agency, without authority to promulgate 
regulations or industry standards.29
Growing frustration with the 1906 Act’s shortcomings
 
30 
prompted Congress to pass the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 1938 (FDCA).31 The FDCA granted the FDA addi-
tional authority over medical devices and cosmetics,32 and pro-
vided for pre-market approval of drugs.33 Food regulations also 
expanded, with the FDA receiving authorization to establish 
enforceable standards for adulterated and misbranded food.34 
Section 341 grants authority to the FDA Secretary to promul-
gate and establish for most food “a reasonable definition and 
standard of identity, a reasonable standard of quality, or rea-
sonable standards of fill of container.”35
 
 25. Paul Hyman, U.S. Food and Drug Law and FDA—A Historical Back-
ground, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULA-
TION, supra note 
 Adulterated food is de-
1, at 21, 63. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 26. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.; see also FDA History: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its En-
forcement, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ 
ucm054819.htm (last updated June 18, 2009) (describing the scope of the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act and the Bureau of Chemistry’s role in enforcing it). 
 30. Hyman, supra note 25, at 30. 
 31. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
 32. Hyman, supra note 25, at 30, 35–36; see also FDA History: The 1938 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012).  
 33. Hyman, supra note 25, at 35; FDA History: The 1938 Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, supra note 32. 
 34. Hyman, supra note 25, at 34–35. 
 35. § 341. Exceptions to the FDA’s authority to establish a definition, 
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fined in Section 342 as that containing “any poisonous or dele-
terious substance which may render it injurious to health,”36 
that which contains or may have been contaminated with 
“filth,”37 or that which has been altered to increase its bulk or 
value.38 Misbranded food is controlled under Section 343, which 
prohibits “false or misleading” labels,39 requires imitation foods 
to be clearly labeled as such,40 and mandates that foods subject 
to FDA standards of identity, quality, and container fill must 
conform to such standards.41
The regulatory scheme of the 1938 Act is still largely in 
place, though multiple amendments and acts have further ex-
panded and defined FDA authority related to food regulations.
  
42 
The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 gave the FDA power to 
require pre-approval of substances added to food.43 A food addi-
tive is defined as that which may reasonably become a compo-
nent of the food or affect the food’s characteristics if it is “not 
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific 
training and experience to evaluate its safety . . . to be safe un-
der the conditions of its intended use.”44 An exception to this 
definition is substances generally recognized as safe (GRAS).45 
The FDA grants GRAS status if it can be shown “not only that 
a substance is safe, but also that it is widely viewed as such by 
experts in the field.”46 The Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act (NLEA) later overhauled food labeling requirements.47 The 
NLEA provided for uniform, mandatory nutritional labeling 
controlled by the FDA, with express federal preemption over 
any non-identical state requirements.48
 
standard of identity, and standard of quality are butter and fresh or dried 
fruits and vegetables. Id.  
  
 36. § 342(a)(1). 
 37. § 342(a)(2). 
 38. § 342(b). 
 39. § 343(a). 
 40. § 343(c). 
 41. § 342(g)–(h).  
 42. Hyman, supra note 25, at 38. 
 43. § 348; Hyman, supra note 25, at 39.  
 44. § 321(s). 
 45. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(j) (2013). 
 46. Kracov & Glasser, supra note 1, at 272. 
 47. § 343-1; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-535, § 6, 104 Stat. 2353, 2362–64 (1990), available at http://uscode 
.house.gov/statutes/1990/1990-101-0535.pdf. 
 48. § 343-1; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act § 6; Hyman, supra note 
25, at 50. 
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It is within this regulatory framework that the FDA con-
siders the use in food of new plant varieties developed through 
genetic modification.49 The FDA considers GMOs to be GRAS,50 
so premarket review as food additives is not mandatory51 unless 
there is a “safety question sufficient to call into question the 
presumed GRAS status.”52
1. Toxicants known to be characteristic of the host and donor species;  
 However, voluntary premarket con-
sultation is encouraged, under which the FDA primarily as-
sesses:  
2. The potential that food allergens will be transferred from one food 
source to another;  
3. The concentration and bioavailability of important nutrients for 
which a food crop is ordinarily consumed;  
4. The safety and nutritional value of newly introduced proteins; and  
5. The identity, composition and nutritional value of modified carbo-
hydrates, or fats and oils.53
The process used to create the product is largely irrelevant 
to the FDA, as it operates under the assumption that the prod-
uct itself is the key safety consideration.
 
54
The FDA considers genetic modification to be a “continu-
um” of traditional breeding used for centuries to selectively en-
courage favorable traits in plants.
 
55 As such, the process of 
plant breeding used is irrelevant as long as the resulting prod-
ucts are “substantially equivalent.”56
 
 49. See 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 
 Taking the position that 
16, at 22,988–89. 
 50. Id. at 22,990 (“With respect to transferred genetic material (nucleic 
acids), generally FDA does not anticipate that transferred genetic material 
would itself be subject to food additive regulation. Nucleic acids are present in 
the cells of every living organism, including every plant and animal used for 
food by humans or animals, and do not raise a safety concern as a component 
of food.”). 
 51. Kathleen A. Merrigan, Principles Driving U.S. Governance of 
Agbiotech, in GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: INTERIM POLICIES, UNCER-
TAIN LEGISLATION, supra note 5, at 211.  
 52. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,990. 
 53. Id. at 22,992. 
 54. Eva Merian Spahn, Keep Away from Mouth: How the American System 
of Food Regulation Is Killing Us, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 694–95 (2011) (ar-
guing for an overhaul of the U.S. food regulation scheme, including the adop-
tion of a heightened duty of care for food producers). 
 55. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,985–86 (explaining the 
FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA relating to GMOs). 
 56. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SAFETY EVALUATION OF 
FOODS DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY 14 (1993), available at http:// 
www.oecd.org/science/biosafety-biotrack/41036698.pdf (“The concept of sub-
stantial equivalence embodies the idea that existing organisms used as food, 
or as a source of food, can be used as the basis for comparison when assessing 
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GMOs do not “present any different or greater safety concern 
than foods developed by traditional plant breeding,” the FDA 
does not require labeling to disclose genetic modification.57 
Such labeling would only be required if the new plant variety 
constituted misbranding by “differ[ing] from its traditional 
counterpart such that the common or usual name no longer ap-
plies to the new food, or if a safety or usage issue exists to 
which consumers must be alerted.”58 Those producers who wish 
to voluntarily label (whether indicating the use of bioengineer-
ing or lack thereof) may do so, and the FDA has released non-
binding guidance to help direct such labeling.59 The FDA sug-
gests that statements such as “GMO free” may be misleading 
without a uniform threshold level for GMOs above which the 
label cannot be used, which does not currently exist.60 However, 
despite consumer support for GMO labeling, the FDA does not 
require it without a showing of adverse health effects.61
B. STATES’ STANCES ON GMO LABELS 
 In 
short, while the FDA has authority over food in interstate 
commerce and its labeling, it has yet to proceed beyond non-
binding recommendations when it comes to GMOs. 
State governments, on the other hand, have been eager to 
step in and take a stand on GMOs. In 2011 and 2012, nineteen 
states considered mandatory GMO labeling legislation.62
 
the safety of human consumption of a food or food component that has been 
modified or is new.”). 
 Two 
 57. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,991 ( “[T]he agency does 
not believe that the method of development of a new plant variety . . . is nor-
mally material information within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 321(n) and would 
not usually be required to be disclosed in labeling for the food.”). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods 
Have or Have not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Draft Guidance, FDA, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Guidance 
DocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm (last 
updated Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Draft Guidance]. 
 60. See id.; see also DETECTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: 
CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF TESTING TO RESOLVE A BIOTECH FOOD FIGHT, 
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/ 
Summaries_-_reports_and_pubs/proceedings2.pdf (“[N]either protein testing 
nor DNA testing by themselves are sufficient to reach conclusions about the 
amount of GMOs present in shipment of grain or a truckload of tortillas.”).  
 61. 1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 16, at 22,991. 
 62. Ronnie Cummins, Letter to Organic Consumer, Posted in Organic 
Bytes, ORGANICCONSUMERS.ORG, http://organicconsumers.org/letter-9-18.htm 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
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states—California and Oregon—took the issue directly to the 
voters through ballot initiatives. California’s Proposition 37, 
billed as the “Right to Know” Act,63 received strong early back-
ing,64 but failed at the polls.65 Supporters of the “Right to Know” 
Act attribute the loss to the last-minute injection of corporate 
funds from agro-chemical companies, such as Monsanto, to 
fight the initiative.66 The “No on 37” campaign outspent the la-
beling supporters five-to-one.67 Those against the ballot meas-
ure, however, declared it the result of logic and science winning 
out over fear.68 In Oregon, voters struck down a similar ballot 
initiative in 2002.69 Despite early polls showing 58% of voters 
supported the measure, 70.5% of voters rejected the bill.70 In 
addition, New Mexico’s legislature debated an amendment to 
the New Mexico Food Act requiring labeling for GMOs, but the 
measure died on the Senate floor on January 31, 2013.71
Despite these past defeats, states have continued to push 
for GMO labeling mandates. Vermont’s House passed a bill to 
require GMO labels, which the Senate is not expected to con-




 63. Proposition 37, supra note 
 Connecticut and Maine both suc-
19. 
 64. Cal. Bus. Roundtable & Pepperdine Univ., Initiative Survey Series 
2012, CAL. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, http://www.cbrt.org/initiative-survey-series 
-2012/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (showing that 69.4% of voters supported the 
initiative on Aug. 2, 2012).  
 65. Marc Lifsher, California Voters Say No to Labeling Genetically Engi-
neered Food, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/07/ 
business/la-fi-mo-genetically-engineered-food-labeling-20121107. 
 66. Lynne Peeples, Prop 37 GMO Labeling Law Defeated by Corporate 
Dollars and Deception, Proponents Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/proposition-37-gmo-labeling_n_ 
2090112.html (“Prior to the opposition's $46 million push, proponents had held 
a consistent two-fold lead in the polls.”). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. (quoting a statement from Dr. Henry I. Miller of the Hoover Insti-
tution, a think tank at Stanford University).  
 69. KERRY-ANN T. POWELL, VOTERS IN SEVEN CALIFORNIA COUNTIES 
CONSIDER BANNING GENETICALLY ENGINEERED AGRICULTURE 8 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/California%20Counties_ 
GE_Ag_USPIRG.pdf.  
 70. Id. 
 71. See Elaine Watson, Lobbying by Agri-Business Killed New Mexico 
GMO Labeling Bill, Claim Supporters, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Feb. 05, 
2013), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Regulation/Lobbying-by-agri 
-business-killed-New-Mexico-GMO-labeling-Bill-claim-supporters. See general-
ly S.B. 18, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013). 
 72. Andrew Stein, GMO Labeling Bill Positioned for Action Next Session, 
VTDIGGER.ORG (May 7, 2013), http://vtdigger.org/2013/05/07/gmo-labeling-bill 
-positioned-for-action-next-session/. 
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ceeded in passing labeling bills in early 2013; however, the reg-
ulations will not go into effect unless other states, including a 
neighboring state, pass similar bills.73 GMO labeling supporters 
in Washington submitted over 350,000 signatures—100,000 
more than necessary to qualify an initiative to the Legisla-
ture—in support of genetically modified food labels.74 The Leg-
islature had an opportunity to pass the initiative as written, 
but took no action; the decision now turns to the voters on the 
November 2013 general election ballot.75 Further, GMO label 
supporters are gaining ground in Oregon, Florida, and Minne-
sota to pursue legislation.76 While no label mandates have tak-
en effect yet,77 wide voter support across party lines78
The proposed state legislation has largely followed the 
same formula. First, the bills require genetically engineered 
food to be labeled as such. In Colorado, the mandatory lan-
guage was either “genetically engineered” or “This product con-
tains or was produced with a genetically engineered materi-
al.”
 suggests 
legislation will likely continue coming to the floor and cropping 
up in ballot initiatives.  
79
 
 73. Elaine Watson, Maine House Backs GMO Labeling Bill, FOOD NAVI-
GATOR-USA.COM (June 12, 2013), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/ 
Regulation/Maine-House-backs-GMO-labeling-bill. Maine’s bill requires five 
contiguous states to pass similar legislation in order to go into effect. Id. Con-
necticut would require four other states with an aggregate population of at 
least twenty million and at least one state must be neighboring. Jessica Cor-
bett, GMO Domino Effect, IN THESE TIMES (Jul. 14, 2013), http://www 
.inthesetimes.com/article/15225/gmo_domino_effect/. 
 Connecticut specified that raw agricultural commodities 
should be labeled “Genetically Engineered,” while processed 
food should indicate “Partially Produced with Genetic Engi-
neering” or “May be Partially Produced with Genetic Engineer-
 74. Jim Camden, State May Vote on GMO Labeling, THE SPOKESMAN-
REV., Jan. 4, 2013, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/jan/04/state-may 
-vote-on-gmo-labeling/.  
 75. Dan Flynn, Campaign for GM Food Labeling Gets New State Battle-
ground, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (April 29, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/ 
2013/04/olympias-inaction-sets-up-re-match-for-gm-food-labeling/. 
 76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Helena Bottemiller, With Recent Victories, Movement to Label 
GMOs Gains Steam, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (June 27, 2013), http://www 
.foodsafetynews.com/2013/06/movement-to-label-gmos-gaining-
steam/#.UiuxMsbEPVk. 
 78. Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc., supra note 11, at 1 
(finding in a survey of 1,000 2012 general election voters that 93% of Demo-
crats, 89% of Republicans, and 90% of independents are in favor of labeling). 
 79. S. 01-146, 63d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 25-5-411 (Colo. 2001). 
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ing.”80 Hawaii’s legislature has heard at least seven labeling 
bills,81 which would have required labels to state “THIS 
PRODUCT CONTAINS A GENETICALLY ENGINEERED 
MATERIAL, OR WAS PRODUCED WITH A GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED MATERIAL.”82 In addition to specific language, 
the bills specify the size and appearance of the disclaimer. 
Washington’s legislation detailed that the label “must appear 
either: (a) On the front package or label of any such commodity; 
or (b) In the case of such a commodity that is not separately 
packaged or labeled, on a label appearing on the retail store 
shelf or bin.”83 Some states stipulate specific font sizes,84 while 
others, such as Vermont, simply require the statement to be 
“prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness . . . as 
to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary 
individual under customary conditions of purchase and use.”85
The state legislation also defines what is to be considered 
genetically modified food. Colorado’s proposed bill provides for 
the definition to shift with advances of science: 
 
“Genetically engineered food” means the following: (a) All foods de-
rived in whole or in part from a genetically engineered virus, microor-
ganism, plant, livestock, or other organism if such genetically engi-
neered material can be detected at a level at least twice the limits of 
detection of the most sensitive method commercially available for de-
tection of that particular type of genetically engineered material.86
New Mexico would require labeling for any food where “ge-
netically engineered material accounts for more than one-tenth 




 80. H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 2(a) (Conn. 2012).  
 Others 
simply state that food is genetically modified if any ingredient 
 81. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, LEGISLATION TRACK-
ER 2006 (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ 
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_Legislative_ 
Tracker.pdf. 
 82. See, e.g., H.R. 2034, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 328(a) (Haw. 2012). 
 83. S. 6298, 62d Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (Wash. 2012). 
 84. See, e.g., H.R. 2808, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. § 2 Subd.1. (Minn. 2012) 
(requiring the GE label to be “in boldface print of not less than ten-point 
type”). 
 85. H.R. 722, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 4060(a)(6) (Vt. 2012).  
 86. S. 01-146, 63d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 25-5-402(12.3) (Colo. 
2001). 
 87. S. 906, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. § 4(A) (N.M. 2005); cf. Proposition 37, su-
pra note 19 (providing an exception for processed food where no GMOs “ac-
count[] for more than one-half of one percent of the total weight” and there are 
no more than ten genetically engineered ingredients).  
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is produced with genetic engineering.88 States differ on whether 
to consider animals fed with genetically modified materials as 
genetically modified food themselves.89 Finally, the proposed 
bills provide that violations of the labeling mandate will be a 
misdemeanor.90
States thus have very similar ideas about what GMO label-
ing should look like. Despite this apparent meeting of the 
minds, however, states may not have the authority to regulate 
in this arena. 
 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES FOR STATE REGULATIONS 
Even if a state capitalizes on the public demand for GMO 
labels and passes a bill mandating disclosure, the legislation 
may not withstand constitutional challenges. While the federal 
government largely works alongside state governments to regu-
late food,91 state regulations must still comply with the limits of 
the Commerce Clause and federal preemption or risk invalida-
tion.92
1. Commerce Clause 
 
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”93 The Supreme Court’s ju-
dicial oversight has delineated over the years the extent to 
which Congress’s power may restrict state regulation.94 The 
Commerce Clause itself is a grant of power—not a prohibition 
on state regulation unless Congress elects to regulate the ar-
ea.95
 
 88. H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 1(3) (Conn. 2012). 
 The modern view of the Commerce Clause allows Congress 
 89. Compare H.R. 4025, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1105(a)(xvi) (Mich. 2001) 
(stipulating that food derived from an animal fed with or treated with GMOs 
is itself genetically modified), with H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 2(c)(1) 
(Conn. 2012) (creating an exception for animals “fed or injected with any ge-
netically-engineered food”).  
 90. See, e.g., H.R. 2808, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. § 2 Subd. 5 (Minn. 2012). 
 91. Fred H. Degnan, The Food and Drug Administration—How It Is Or-
ganized and Works, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW 
AND REGULATION, supra note 1, at 118. 
 92. See Edward P. Richards, III, Overview of the U.S. Legal System, in A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION, supra 
note 1, at 2–3 (explaining federal commerce powers). 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 94. Richards, supra note 92, at 2. 
 95. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cas-
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to “(1) Regulate the channels of interstate commerce; (2) protect 
the ‘instrumentalities,’ persons, and things involved with inter-
state commerce from any threat; and, (3) regulate those activi-
ties having a ‘substantial relation to interstate commerce.’”96
The Court has also held that state regulations may be fur-
ther restrained—even if Congress has not acted—under the 
concept of the “Dormant” Commerce Clause.
  
97 A court’s inquiry 
under a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge has two consid-
erations.98 The first consideration is if the regulation is discrim-
inatory99 between in-state and out-of-state economic inter-
ests.100 If it is discriminatory, it is virtually per se 
unconstitutional.101 If it is facially neutral, the court proceeds to 
the second consideration, applying a balancing standard to de-
termine whether the “local benefits outweigh the incidental 
burdens to interstate commerce.”102 The court should particu-
larly consider a regulation’s effects on interstate commerce if 
multiple states were to regulate in the same area,103 and if a 
less burdensome regulation could achieve the same benefit.104
2. Federal Preemption 
  
The Dormant Commerce Clause can be considered a form 
of implied preemption.105
 
es, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2009). 
 However, preemption extends beyond 
 96. Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the Superman: Why Congress Cannot 
Constitutionally Prohibit Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 418 
(2003) (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)). 
 97. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179–80 
(1995). 
 98. Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of In-
terstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 571, 573–74 (1997). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
 101. O’Grady, supra note 98, at 574. 
 102. Emily Robertson, Note, Finding a Compromise in the Debate over Ge-
netically Modified Food: An Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-to-
Know Act, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 156, 181–82 (2003). 
 103. Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 526–30 (1959) (stating 
that the existence of conflicting regulations in neighboring states must be con-
sidered when assessing a regulation’s potential burden on interstate com-
merce). 
 104. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (examining 
the constitutional conflicts of state regulations for hormone-produced milk); 
see also Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regu-
lating Recombinant bST, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 294 (1997). 
 105. See Degnan, supra note 91, at 118.  
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the Commerce Clause. Preemption occurs in areas of shared 
regulatory power where state and federal laws conflict.106 When 
this occurs, federal law takes priority, and inconsistent state 
regulations are null and void.107 Preemption takes on four 
forms: implied, express, field, and conflict.108 Implied preemp-
tion exists where the federal government has authority over the 
area pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce 
Clause.109 Express preemption occurs where a federal law ex-
plicitly bars states from regulating in that area.110 For instance, 
the NLEA provides that “no State or political subdivision of a 
State may directly or indirectly establish under any authority 
or continue in effect as to any food in interstate commerce” cer-
tain requirements for food or labeling covered under the Act.111 
The court will then consider whether the state regulation is 
within the scope of the federal regulation and thus invalid.112
Conflict preemption occurs where there is no express 
statement in the law, but the state and federal regulations 
cannot both be followed.
  
113 Conflict preemption does not mean 
that a state cannot regulate in the area, just that competing 
purposes prevent the state’s particular regulation.114 Field 
preemption is “a species of conflict pre-emption.”115 In these 
cases, there is not a direct conflict, but Congress has “so com-
pletely occupied the field”116 that there is “no room” for state 
regulation.117 If Congress has occupied the field, it completely 
bars states from regulating in the area as deference to Con-
gress’s determination that state exclusion is necessary and 
proper.118
State regulations thus face significant constitutional hur-
dles when regulating areas Congress has acted in or that may 
  
 
 106. See Richards, supra note 92, at 4. 
 107. See id.; see also Degnan, supra note 91, at 118. 
 108. Kinley Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 999 F.2d 354, 358 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 109. See Degnan, supra note 91, at 118. 
 110. See Richards, supra note 92, at 4.  
 111. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).  
 112. See Robertson, supra note 102, at 166. 
 113. Burk, supra note 104, at 250. 
 114. Id. at 250–51. 
 115. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).  
 116. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984). 
 117. See Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 72 (1988) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State 
Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983); Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 118. Id. at 72–73. 
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be considered Congress’s sole territory. As Part II will show, 
this likely poses a significant barrier to states’ attempts to im-
pose mandatory GMO labeling. 
II.  STATE GMO LAWS CANNOT WITHSTAND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES   
This Part considers whether constitutional concerns inval-
idate state GMO regulations. First, Section A analyzes state 
labeling laws’ impact on interstate commerce under a Dormant 
Commerce Clause balancing test. Section B then addresses 
whether federal labeling regulations preempt state regulations. 
This Part concludes that state regulations are likely barred 
both under a Dormant Commerce Clause evaluation and under 
federal preemption considerations.  
A. MANDATORY LABELS IMPROPERLY TIP THE BALANCE OF 
LOCAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL IMPACTS 
When courts evaluate claims that a state regulation vio-
lates the Dormant Commerce Clause, the first inquiry is if the 
regulation is facially discriminatory.119 For example, a Massa-
chusetts law that imposed a tax on milk but provided a subsidy 
to in-state producers was considered discriminatory because 
the tax was “effectively imposed only on out-of-state prod-
ucts.”120 In the case of state GMO label requirements, manufac-
turers both in and out of the state equally bear the cost and du-
ty of labeling food products, and thus they are unlikely to be 
overruled as discriminatory.121 To the extent that the regula-
tions favor manufacturers and growers who do not use genet-
ically engineered crops, such as the organic food industry, the 
impact is not limited to in-state producers.122
However, such regulations must still be considered under 




 119. See Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
 The balancing test considers whether 
a state’s interest is sufficient to allow the incidental burden on 
 120. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994). 
 121. See Keane, supra note 22, at 313.  
 122. See Grocery Mfrs. of Am. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1003 (2d Cir. 1985); 
see also Robertson, supra note 102, at 183. 
 123. See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (stating that the Pike balancing test applies 
where there are legitimate state concerns with incidental effects on interstate 
commerce).  
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interstate commerce to continue.124 If there is a legitimate local 
interest, then courts look to the extent of the burden and if al-
ternate actions could promote the same interest with a lesser 
impact.125
1. Local Interests 
 
The purpose and design of state GMO regulations, sup-
porters argue, is to allow consumers to make informed choices 
about what they eat and protect consumers since GMOs have 
not been affirmatively proven safe.126 Courts have previously 
found that consumer education and protection is a legitimate 
state interest.127 This interest lies within the states’ police pow-
er to protect its citizens’ health and welfare.128 However, it is 
unclear whether GMOs pose any threat to health and wel-
fare.129 If GMOs pose no greater risk than traditional food, it 
casts doubt on states’ ability to regulate them separately under 
the guise of consumer protection.130 Without health and safety 
concerns, the state’s interest relies on protecting consumers’ 
right to know what is in their food. Courts have held that this 
alone is insufficient to support labeling mandates.131
 
 124. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 The FDA 
 125. Id.  
 126. Facts—Yes on Prop 37, CAL. RIGHT TO KNOW, http://www 
.carighttoknow.org/facts (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).  
 127. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. of Am., 755 F.2d at 1003–04 (holding that dis-
tinguishing between real cheese and alternative cheese is a legitimate state 
concern). 
 128. Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in Regulating Food Labeling and 
Advertising: The Effect of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 649, 652 (1994). 
 129. Compare Chelsea Snell et al., Assessment of the Health Impact of GM 
Plant Diets in Long-Term and Multigenerational Animal Feeding Trials: A 
Literature Review, 50 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 1134, 1143 (2012) 
(“[T]he available long-term studies do not yield new safety concerns [compared 
to 90-day studies] and confirm that the studied GM varieties (most of them are 
major commercial products) are nutritionally equivalent to their non-GM con-
ventional counterparts.”), with Anyadiegwu, supra note 10, at 210 (“Some ef-
fects of new technology are visible and dramatic, but many are delayed and 
uncertain. Therefore, an assessment of such risk and the design of strategies 
to reduce them require the use of scientific and technical information.” (foot-
notes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 130. But see Robertson, supra note 102, at 182 (arguing that Right to Know 
acts are constitutional and within the scope of states’ police power).  
 131. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“Were consumer interest alone sufficient, there is no end to the infor-
mation that states could require manufacturers to disclose about their produc-
tion methods.”).  
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maintains that genetically engineered foods do not present any 
“different or greater safety concerns” than conventionally bred 
foods.132 Courts give significant deference to the FDA’s scientific 
judgment,133 and therefore would be unlikely to find substantial 
state interest unless presented with scientific evidence of safety 
risks.134
2. National Burdens 
  
Assuming in the alternative that states have a local inter-
est in GMO regulations—albeit one weakened by a lack of de-
finitive safety risks—the courts will then determine if the bur-
dens on interstate commerce exceed the intrastate benefits.135 
The burden of such labeling mandates stands to be significant. 
If California, for instance, was to pass GMO laws, it would af-
fect 12% of the nation’s food market.136 Food producers would 
have to evaluate the cost of changing their labels for one state 
compared to the cost of simply avoiding California.137 In the 
past, California regulations have not remained isolated in Cali-
fornia.138 There are several possible explanations for this Cali-
fornia effect: “[E]ither because its regulations or bans encour-
age other states or the federal government to adopt them, or 
because they force producers to change their offerings nation-
wide, or because they force the regulated industry to seek 
preemptive nationwide regulation.”139 Whatever the reason may 
be, California’s GMO regulations will likely reverberate na-
tionwide.140
 
 132. Letter from Lester M. Crawford, Deputy Comm’r, FDA, to John A. 
Kitzhaber, Governor, Or. (Oct. 4, 2002), available at http://www.bio.org/ 
sites/default/files/Kitzhaber.pdf. 
  
 133. See, e.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 
(D.D.C. 2000).  
 134. Cf. id. (suggesting that if the FDA’s position was shown to be irration-
al, e.g., by the production of contrary scientific evidence, it would not be enti-
tled to deference). 
 135. See O’Grady, supra note 98, at 574.  
 136. Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” & the Future of American 
Food: How California's Growing Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the 
State & the Nation, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 357, 357–58 (2010). 
 137. Cf. id. at 358 (“Companies that can no longer market a food in Cali-
fornia may be forced to decide whether that product—robbed of twelve percent 
of its potential market—is still viable.”).  
 138. Id. at 384–85. For example, when California banned trans fats, many 
state and local governments subsequently introduced similar measures. Id. at 
378.  
 139. Id. at 384–85. 
 140. See id. at 389 (“California’s mushrooming food and agricultural regu-
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This effect has been observed in other states as well. Until 
2011, a Pennsylvania regulation required bread producers to 
print a mark evidencing registration with the state on all bread 
packaging.141 Producers with multi-state operations found it 
cheaper and simpler to include this marking on all packag-
ing.142 However, the inconspicuous language “Reg. Penna. Dept. 
Agr.”143 likely had a more neutral impact on consumers than a 
label such as Connecticut’s proposed “Partially Produced with 
Genetic Engineering” label.144 If consumers see GMOs as a de-
cision factor in their purchases, such labeling operates as a 
warning as it “clearly suggests one choice over another.”145 La-
beling mandates can thus influence consumer purchases na-
tionwide even if only passed in one state. The impact may be 
magnified if multiple states pass different labeling require-
ments, which could require packaging to contain several vari-
ously worded GMO warnings in order to comply with all regu-
lations.146
GMO label supporters argue that labeling changes occur 
frequently and the changes required by the mandate would en-
tail no cost to the producers.
 
147 But the cost of a new label is not 
the only cost involved—producers must know whether their 
products contain GMOs in order to comply with labeling re-
quirements.148
 
lations and bans—the result of the state’s propensity toward hyper-regulation 
and the resultant California effect—are spreading across America.”). 
 This entails segregation of GE and non-GE crops 
all the way from farmer to producer, which would mean infra-
structure modifications, including separating crops (potentially 
requiring buffer land to avoid cross-pollination), establishing 
 141. See Pennsylvania Food Act, 31 PA. STAT. §§ 20.1–20.18 (1994), re-
pealed by Act 106 of 2010, P.L. 1039, No. 106 § 8 (2010). Pennsylvania law now 
states, “The secretary may promulgate regulations allowing food establish-
ments to label their food products as having been registered by the depart-
ment.” 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5735 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 142. Linnekin, supra note 136, at 377. 
 143. See generally 7 PA. CODE § 46.3 (2004). 
 144. H.R. 5117, 2012 Leg., Feb. Sess. § 2(a) (Conn. 2012).  
 145. Donna M. Byrne, Cloned Meat, Voluntary Food Labeling, and Organic 
Oreos, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 31, 36, 77–78 (2009) (“When presented with infor-
mation on a label, assuming they notice it, and they do not always notice it, 
the unknowing consumers tend to perceive the label information as a warning. 
The label does two things—it tells them there is an issue of concern, serving 
an educational function, and it warns them about this product.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 146. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 653.  
 147. Facts—Yes on Prop 37, supra note 126. 
 148. See Byrne, supra note 145, at 69.  
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distinct storage and processing facilities, and transporting GE 
and non-GE crops separately.149 Opponents of California’s now-
rejected labeling initiative estimate that if non-GE ingredients 
replace GE ingredients, the cost to consumers would be a mid-
point of at least $348 per California household.150
Evaluating the impact in other countries that have im-
posed GMO labeling mandates can further illuminate potential 
burdens on interstate commerce. A study of the impact of vol-
untary versus mandatory labeling found that “[M]andatory la-
belling in the European Union (EU) has resulted in the virtual 
disappearance of any GM-labelled product, so in practice EU 
consumers do not have a choice when they go shopping.”
  
151 
Mandatory labeling in Japan similarly resulted in an effective 
elimination of GM products.152 History thus indicates that 
mandatory labeling could destroy a segment of the food mar-
ket.153 This potential lack of choice, combined with the price in-
creases forced on all consumers, poses a significant burden on 
interstate commerce that outweighs the state benefit of in-
formed shoppers.154
As such, since mandatory state GMO labels would encum-
ber purchases and food supplies nationwide, as well as increas-
ing costs from farmers all the way up to consumers, the regula-
tions would likely fail a Dormant Commerce Clause balancing 
test. These burdens on interstate commerce exceed any possible 
  
 
 149. See NORTHBRIDGE ENVTL. MGMT. CONSULTANTS, THE GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED FOODS MANDATORY LABELING INITIATIVE 20–22 (Jul. 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.noprop37.com/files/Prop.-37-Will-Raise-Grocery-Bills 
-400-Annually.pdf. 
 150. See id. at 7, 34 (stating that two possible compliance scenarios result 
in costs of $401 and $348 per household, respectively). But cf. Debra M. 
Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Im-
porting Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 192 
(2006) (“The estimated costs for the more extensive GM labeling options under 
consideration in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia were calcu-
lated as $3 to $10 a year per person.”).  
 151. Guillaume P. Gruère et al., What Labelling Policy for Consumer 
Choice? The Case of Genetically Modified Food in Canada and Europe, 41 
CANADIAN J. ECON. 1472, 1474 (2008).  
 152. Guillaume P. Gruère & S.R. Rao, A Review of International Labeling 
Policies of Genetically Modified Food to Evaluate India’s Proposed Rule, 10 
AGBIOFORUM 51, 54 (2007).  
 153. See id. Gruère and Rao observe that China appears to be the only 
country with mandatory labeling where GM products are still readily availa-
ble. Id. at 54 n.2.  
 154. Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting the weakness of a 
consumer curiosity interest). 
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local interest of informing consumers.  
B. FDA LABEL REGULATIONS LEAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR STATE 
MANDATES 
If courts do not invalidate state labeling mandates under 
the implied preemption of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the 
regulations would likely still be unconstitutional through ex-
press or field preemption.  
Express preemption seems like a simple case—either the 
federal law precludes state interference with explicit language 
or it does not. An actual express preemption consideration, 
however, is not so simple, as courts must scrutinize the explicit 
language to determine the boundaries of the preemptive 
scope.155 Courts have not yet considered whether the express 
preemption of the NLEA would extend to state GMO labels,156 
but such an interpretation is unlikely.157 To determine the 
scope of preemption, courts will look to congressional intent.158
When passing the NLEA, Congress specifically limited the 
scope to nutritional labeling because extending the scope to 
warning labels posed a danger to the Act’s passage.
  
159 As Sena-
tor Orrin Hatch explained, “[T]he compromise makes clear that 
the national uniformity in food labeling that is set forth in the 
legislation has absolutely no effect on preemption of State or 
local requirements that relate to such things as warnings about 
foods or components of food.”160 Further, Congress was explicit 
within the Act that its preemption was limited to the scope de-
fined therein, leaving little wiggle room.161 Congress did not 
want to ban states entirely from food labeling,162 especially con-
sidering its reliance on states to help enforce FDA regula-
tions.163 Even if the Act omitted this preemption limitation, the 
mere existence of any express preemption statement precludes 
implied preemption to expand the scope further.164
 
 155. See Burk, supra note 
  
104, at 249–50.  
 156. Robertson, supra note 102, at 165.  
 157. Cf. Burk, supra note 104, at 249 (“[I]n each instance the two interests 
will be balanced, accommodating local regulation wherever possible.”). 
 158. Id. at 166. 
 159. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 659–60.  
 160. 136 CONG. REC. 33,429 (1990) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 161. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006) (explicitly listing what state and local 
governments may not do under the Act); see also Burk, supra note 104, at 258. 
 162. See Burk, supra note 104, at 259.  
 163. See Degnan, supra note 91, at 118–19. 
 164. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). But see 
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However, even if the NLEA does not preempt state GMO 
labels, preemption may still be found in other federal regula-
tions.165 The entire scope of food regulations—expanding beyond 
the NLEA—could implicate field preemption, in that Congress 
has so occupied the field as to exclude states from regulating.166 
Neither the motive behind the state regulation nor its result is 
relevant; field preemption prevents any state regulations in 
that field, even if the regulations “appear to support or further 
the purpose of the federal statutes.”167 As with express preemp-
tion, courts typically look to congressional intent to determine 
if field preemption is applicable.168 As the congressional record, 
discussed earlier,169 demonstrates, excluding states from the 
realm of labeling was not Congress’s intent.170 This stated in-
tent may be enough to overcome field preemption arguments, 
as there is a “strong presumption against preemption.”171
However, the Court recently has deviated from this tradi-
tional preemption analysis in some cases.
  
172 In AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, for example, the Court found that one of the 
Agency’s objectives was to “protect corporations from hostile 
courts and interfering tort actions.”173 The Court held that a 
clause reserving state regulations could not uphold regulations 
that stood as an obstacle to that objective.174
 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287–89 (1995) (arguing that ex-
press preemption suggests that Congress did not intend to preempt other mat-
ters, but does not foreclose all possibility of implied preemption). 
 Courts could simi-
 165. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 660. 
 166. See Burk, supra note 104, at 251 (citing Wolfson, supra note 117, at 
77–78) (discussing a “delicate balance” theory, according to which some courts 
will reject state or local legislation in an otherwise open area to avoid disrupt-
ing the delicate balance of an apparently precise legislative scheme).  
 167. See id. at 250. 
 168. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (considering 
whether a state law was “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63.  
 170. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 33,428–29 (1990) (statement of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch). 
 171. Bradley, supra note 128, at 658. 
 172. Pamela A. Vesilind, Emerging Constitutional Threats to Food Labeling 
Reform, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 59, 68 (2012) (“[T]he analyses bypassed 
any substantive discussion or application of the traditional presumption that 
state police powers are preserved absent clear congressional intent to the con-
trary.”). 
 173. Id. at 70. 
 174. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (hold-
ing that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s judicial rule declar-
ing class arbitration waivers unconscionable). 
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larly find an objective in federal food regulation laws to protect 
producers from having to comply with and defend against regu-
lations varying from state to state. Senator Hatch argued as 
much when introducing the NLEA on the Senate floor: 
[I]t is wrong to permit each of the 50 States to require manufacturers 
of 20,000 packaged food items to display different health and diet in-
formation on identical products sold throughout this country. And, it 
is wrong to burden the manufacturer with the fear of potentially 50 
different lawsuits from 50 different State attorneys general, even if 
similar cases have been dismissed or settled.175
If courts read such an objective into the NLEA, then state 
GMO laws may be considered an extension of this concern. 
Thus, states could be preempted as an obstacle to Congress’s 
intent despite the reservation of states’ power to create and en-
force additional labeling requirements.  
 
In addition to congressional intent, courts reviewing state 
GMO laws will likely consider the position of the FDA, which 
the Court has found to be “dispositive” regarding preemption.176 
The Court held in Medtronic v. Lohr that the FDA is “uniquely 
qualified” to make this determination as “the federal agency to 
which Congress has delegated its authority to implement the 
provisions of the Act.”177 The FDA maintains that labeling 
GMOs is unnecessary and potentially misleading in the ab-
sence of scientific evidence of safety risks.178 This position has 
been set forth in guidance documents that, though not binding, 
are still entitled to deference by the courts.179 The FDA’s posi-
tion is that the presence of genetically modified ingredients is 
not material and thus does not require special labeling,180
If looking solely to congressional intent, the argument for 
express or field preemption is weak. However, when the expert 
 a de-
cision informed by the Agency’s expertise in food regulations. 
This determination should not be limited to federal regulations, 
but should extend to bar state regulations, and should play a 
significant role in courts’ determination of field preemption.  
 
 175. 136 CONG. REC. 33,428 (1990) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 176. Eric G. Lasker, FDA Position on Federal Preemption Consistent with 
Law and Public Health, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 25, 2005, at 1, 3 (quot-
ing Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 
(1985)). 
 177. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996). 
 178. Draft Guidance, supra note 59. 
 179. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. of Am. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1002 (2d Cir. 
1985) (“The distinctions between formal rules and interpretive rules or general 
statements of policy are often vague.”). 
 180. Draft Guidance, supra note 59. 
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opinion of the FDA—granted its authority by Congress—is jus-
tifiably taken into consideration, it is likely that courts will find 
states have been preempted from the field of mandatory GMO 
labels. Coupled with state labeling regulations’ impact on in-
terstate commerce, a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis 
would likely also block state GMO regulations. These two sig-
nificant constitutional concerns stand as a substantial barrier 
to mandatory GMO labeling originating in state governments.  
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS SHOULD SPUR THE 
FDA TO STEP UP AND STEP IN   
This Part argues that FDA implementation of GMO label-
ing is preferable to state regulations. Section A argues that 
consumer demand is an important factor that the FDA can and 
should consider as an impetus for labeling. Section B suggests a 
reasonable labeling scheme should be voluntary and should 
measure GMO presence in finished products. Such a program 
balances consumer concern with manufacturing burdens.  
A. THE FDA SHOULD REMOVE STATES’ TEMPTATION TO 
REGULATE AND ADDRESS CONSUMER DEMAND 
Regardless of the constitutional consequences of state regu-
lations, federal regulation is the preferable method to answer 
consumer concern regarding GMOs. In response to Oregon’s 
GMO labeling initiative in 2002, the FDA itself argued that 
such state GMO label mandates are improper because they 
would “require different labels for different states impeding the 
free flow of commerce between the states.”181 FDA regulation of 
GMOs, conversely, would create uniformity in labeling and re-
lieve producers of the burden of a muddled system of state reg-
ulations.182 The FDA has asserted its authority over monitoring 
the safety of the nation’s food supply.183 However, because it 
views GMOs as essentially the same as their conventional 
counterparts, the FDA does not believe they fall under this 
safety umbrella.184
If the FDA cannot regulate GMOs under safety concerns, 
 
 
 181. Crawford, supra note 132, at 1. 
 182. See Erik Benny, “Natural” Modifications: The FDA’s Need to Promul-
gate an Official Definition of “Natural” that Includes Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1504, 1516–17 (2012) (arguing for similar 
FDA regulation of the use of “natural” on food labels). 
 183. Crawford, supra note 132, at 1. 
 184. Id. 
  
2013] GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD FIGHT 379 
 
then can the FDA regulate because of consumer demand? It 
thinks not. Its current position is that federal regulations can-
not be upheld simply on consumer demand unless a material 
difference first sparks that demand.185 This has not always been 
the FDA’s position, however. The FDA requires labeling of food 
treated with irradiation even though it has determined that 
“there is no concern about the safety of such treatment.”186 This 
label mandate is thus based not on safety, but on consumer 
concern. The Agency explicitly credited consumer concern as 
the motive behind this regulation. “[T]he large number of con-
sumer comments requesting retail labeling attest to the signifi-
cance placed on such information by consumers. . . . Because of 
these comments, FDA had decided to require that the label and 
labeling of food products bear the appropriate statements to in-
form consumers that the food has been irradiated.”187
The FDA also found such labeling valuable because con-
sumers cannot observe irradiation without labeling.
 
188 The 
same argument can be made for GMOs. The FDA received 1.1 
million signatures related to Just Label It’s petition for GMO 
labeling.189 Despite the large number of consumer comments—
more than any previous petition filed with the FDA190—the 
FDA’s response was simply that it needs more time to make a 
decision.191 The FDCA has not changed since the decision to la-
bel irradiated foods in 1986, so the motivation behind the 
FDA’s dismissal of consumer concern in the case of GMOs is 
unclear.192 Since the FDA has previously regulated based on 
consumer concern,193
 
 185. See Burk, supra note 
 and a large segment of the population is 
104, at 271. 
 186. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 
Fed. Reg. 13,376, 13,388 (Apr. 18, 1986). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Strauss, supra note 150, at 184.  
 189. FDA Responds to 1.1 Million, JUST LABEL IT (Apr. 5, 2012), http:// 
justlabelit.org/fda-responds-to-1-1-million/. See generally Docket No. FDA-
2011-P-0723-0001/CP.  
 190. Monica Eng, FDA Finally Responds to GMO-Labeling Campaign but 
Differs on Numbers of Supporters, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2012, http://www 
.chicagotribune.com/features/food/stew/chi-gmolabeling-campaign-claims-a-
million-supporters-but-fda-doesnt-agree-20120328,0,1662591.story. While over 
one million people submitted comments, those submitted via the petition were 
officially counted as one comment since these names were signed to identical 
form letters. Id. As such, the FDA contends it received only 394 comments. Id.  
 191. Id.  
 192. Cf. David Alan Nauheim, Food Labeling and the Consumer’s Right to 
Know: Give the People What They Want, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 97, 125 (2009). 
 193. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. 179 (2013); supra notes 186–87 and accompany-
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concerned about GMOs,194
B. A FEDERAL GMO LABELING REGULATION SHOULD BALANCE 
CONSUMER INTERESTS AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
 the FDA should reverse course and 
establish labeling regulations despite a lack of known safety 
risk.  
A regulation fueled by curiosity rather than necessity 
should be moderate in scope. This consideration should influ-
ence the FDA’s implementation of GMO regulations. The two 
biggest decisions in designing a labeling law are (1) whether it 
should be mandatory or voluntary and (2) when to measure 
GMO presence. This Section argues for voluntary labeling with 
GMO presence tested on the finished product as a solution that 
balances consumer concern and production burdens.  
1. Mandatory Versus Voluntary 
Current international labeling regimes can be a helpful 
starting point for developing a labeling program for the United 
States. There is not an early leader in popularity between 
mandatory versus voluntary systems.195 Jurisdictions such as 
Canada, Hong Kong, and South Africa have adopted voluntary 
plans, while mandatory requirements are in place in Australia, 
Japan, Brazil, and China.196 The EU, operating under a view 
that GMOs are not safe until proven so, has a mandatory re-
gime requiring labels on food produced with GMOs.197 When 
coupled with a negative perception of GMOs, however, manda-
tory labeling can push genetically modified (GM) food out of the 
market.198 Mandatory labeling of GMOs also has the effect of 
raising prices, as practices of the entire market must change to 
accommodate the new requirements.199
Voluntary labeling indicating an absence of GMOs, on the 




 194. THOMSON REUTERS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF HEALTHCARE CONSUMERS: 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD (Oct. 2010), available at http://www 
.justlabelit.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/NPR_report_GeneticEngineered 
Food-1.pdf. The survey of more than 100,000 U.S. households found that 
14.6% view genetically engineered foods as not safe and 64.1% are unsure of 
their safety, with 93.1% supporting labeling of such foods. Id.  
 195. See Gruère & Rao, supra note 152, at 52–53. 
 196. Id. at 52. 
 197. Spahn, supra note 54, at 695–96. 
 198. See Gruère et al., supra note 151, at 1492–94.  
 199. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 192.  
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the change and value the information—consumers who want 
non-GM foods and producers who want to woo them.200 The 
FDA should take this approach since there is little scientific ev-
idence of a pressing concern that would necessitate GMO label-
ing with the exception of consumer desire.201 Some argue that 
this cost should be borne by those who benefit from GM tech-
nology and consequently advocate for labels indicating the 
presence of GMOs.202
Voluntary labeling will also allow the market to respond to 
changing consumer demand.
 However, this ignores that it is not farm-
ers and producers alone who bear the costs of GMO labeling, 
but also consumers. 
203 If consumers respond positively 
to the voluntary labeling, more producers can change methods 
in order to meet that demand,204 utilizing it as a “positive mar-
keting tool to consumers.”205 Conversely, mandatory labeling in 
Europe has had the opposite effect, in that it has virtually shut 
GM food out of the market.206 A voluntary labeling program 
thus allows the market to change in accordance with consumer 
values, rather than imposing anti-GMO values on all consum-
ers by making GMO food prohibitively expensive to produce.207 
Additionally, unlike the FDA’s current non-binding guide-
lines,208
The FDA has previously rejected voluntary labeling with 
the language “GMO free” because it considers the term mis-
leading, as most consumers equate “free” with “zero.”
 a voluntary program could set out compulsory stand-
ards for those who choose to label to ensure transparency in the 
meaning of a non-GMO label.  
209 Howev-
er, other countries with established GMO labeling have deline-
ated a threshold level by which a certain percentage of GMOs 
can be present in food and still be considered GMO free.210
 
 200. Cf. Byrne, supra note 
 The-
145, at 69–70 (arguing that mandatory labeling 
results in indifferent consumers paying more for no added benefit). 
 201. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 132, at 1. 
 202. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 193. 
 203. See Gruère et al., supra note 151, at 1493.  
 204. See id. at 1493–94. 
 205. Strauss, supra note 150, at 193.  
 206. Gruère et al., supra note 151, at 1474.  
 207. See id. at 1486–92 (contending that a mandatory labeling program 
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forced to switch to non-GM products). 
 208. See Draft Guidance, supra note 59. 
 209. See id. 
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datory Labeling of GM Food, AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE, July/Aug. 
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se threshold levels range from 0.9% in the EU to 5% in Japan 
and Canada.211 Establishing too strict of a threshold could be 
dangerous to suppliers, as producers could reject more crops 
because of GMO contamination.212 The FDA believes that 
methods of detection at low percentage levels are currently in-
accurate.213 However, some grain producers have supported Eu-
rope’s 0.9% standard as reasonable and attainable in the Unit-
ed States.214 Using this standard has the added benefit of 
allowing producers to meet GMO thresholds in foreign markets 
as well.215
2. Production Process Versus Finished Product Measurement 
  
Whether a food exceeds the threshold level further depends 
upon if regulations target GMOs in the finished product or in 
the production process.216 The process-based definition consid-
ers genetically modified to mean any food made with GM in-
gredients, even if no trace remains detectable in the finished 
product.217 Labeling regulations based on this definition thus 
must monitor producers and rely more heavily on self-reporting 
of compliance.218 Where the finished product is the concern, 
however, tests can confirm the presence of GMOs.219
 
2012, at 3, 6, available at http://giannini.ucop.edu/media/are-update/files/ 
articles/V15N6_2.pdf. 
 As Guil-
laume P. Gruère and S.R. Rao explain, “This difference is cru-
cial for enforcement: a product-based system can be enforced 
with testing equipment and can filter a cheater, whereas a pro-
cess-based system requires viable and trustable documentation 
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suppliers contend a very low threshold would be practically unworkable due to 
contamination concerns). 
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systems.”220 The product-based system not only provides a 
quantifiable answer of GMO percentages in foods, but it does so 
with little additional burden to the producer (unlike the exten-
sive record-keeping and reporting obligations the process-based 
system would compel).221
3. Consumer Confusion 
 Therefore, a voluntary labeling re-
quirement should apply to finished products as it is verifiable 
and provides the assurance consumers desire.  
One final hurdle for a labeling program is the concern that 
it will cause consumer confusion. Voluntary labeling can create 
the impression in consumers that if “GMO free” is worthy of a 
place on the label, then those products without the language 
must somehow be inferior.222 In response to similar concerns 
over irradiation labeling, the FDA stated, “[A]ny confusion cre-
ated by the presence of a retail label requirement can be cor-
rected by proper consumer education programs, and the pres-
ence of a retail label statement should not deter the 
development of this technology.”223 Requiring an additional 
statement on packaging that “The United States Food and 
Drug Administration has determined that there is no signifi-
cant difference between food produced from genetically modi-
fied and conventional crops” could further address this con-
cern.224
The voluntary labeling of food as “GMO free” would allow 
producers and consumers who value non-GM food to market 
and buy products based on this interest without saddling the 
rest of the market with the cost and burden. This labeling sys-
tem would work hand in hand with market initiatives such as 
 The FDA could reevaluate this requirement and 
eventually remove it, pending consumer education programs 
and a review of their effectiveness in modifying consumer 
knowledge of GMO safety. 
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those from Whole Foods225 or Ben & Jerry’s,226
  CONCLUSION   
 but provide con-
sumers with further assurance that a non-GMO label means 
the same from brand to brand. Voluntary labels with enforcea-
ble standards thus prevent consumer deception while allowing 
the market to dictate the value of GMO free food.  
While the FDA has thus far refused to address GMO label-
ing, the Agency is the proper choice to enact regulations. Its 
hesitance to do so is not based on an inability to regulate in this 
arena. If it continues to waver, states may capitalize on con-
sumer demand and fill the void, even though such regulations 
likely violate the Dormant Commerce Clause and would be 
preempted by any subsequent federal regulation on the matter.  
The FDA should create GMO regulations that balance con-
sumer interests with the dearth of unbiased scientific evidence 
of negative health effects.227
 
 Voluntary labeling—pursuant to 
clear, reasonable, and enforceable definitions of what products 
contain GMOs—allows manufacturers who wish to capitalize 
on concerned consumers to do so without burdening other 
manufacturers or impacting national food supplies. This ap-
proach addresses the somewhat unknown nature of GMOs 
while precluding states from fear mongering and creating con-
sumer confusion with regulations of their own. Although this 
solution does not provide consumers with the full breadth of in-
formation they may desire, it allows consumer choice while re-
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